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In this paper, we develop a model of regulation for a set of heterogenous farmers
whose production yields to environmental externalities. The goal of the regulator is
￿rst to o⁄er some income support depending on collective preferences towards income
redistribution and second to internalize externalities. The optimal policy is constrained
by the information available. We ￿rst consider the second best where the regulator is able
to observe all individuals decisions in terms of inputs and individual pro￿t, but not the
individual farming labor supply. We characterized the generalized transfer in function of
the desire to redistribute and the underlying characteristics of the production process. In a
second step, we assume that the regulator has only information on aggregate consumption
of inputs and hence can only tax/subsidy linearly inputs and output. However, because
the accounting pro￿t remains observable, a non linear transfer of pro￿t is still part of the
optimal policy. In the last part of the paper, we endogenize the market price of land and
examine how the optimal policy should be modi￿ed.
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11 Introduction
Government intervention remains pervasive in agriculture, at least for two reasons. One
is to provide some income support to farmers and the second one is to promote positive
externalities and/or to reduce negative externalities arising from agricultural production. It
appears that agricultural policies in developed countries are often characterized by apparently
countervailing provisions. Indeed, income support motivated subsidies may have undesired
environmental consequences. As noted by Bourgeon and Chambers (2000), production sub-
sidies are granted but at the same time farmers are paid to reduce their acreage. Finally, the
di⁄erent ways governments intervene to achieve several objectives are not equivalent as some
measures are less production and trade distorting than others. These issues and therefore the
design of e¢ cient governmental intervention in agriculture have raised a considerable concern
in the literature.
For instance, Guyomard et al. (2004) (see also Leathers (1992) for an earlier reference)
compare four agricultural income support programs (output subsidy, land subsidy, a decou-
pled payment with or without mandatory production) according to achieve four goals (income
support, reduction of negative externalities, maintenance of a maximum number of farmers
and e⁄ects on trade). It is shown that no program uniformly dominates others. While these
kind of results are of importance, it might be needed to go a little further in order to bet-
ter understand the determinants of optimal governmental intervention and in particular to
understand how to combine e¢ ciently the di⁄erent available instruments.
This is precisely such an approach that Bourgeon and Chambers (2000) have used to
study the optimal design of income support in agriculture (as well as public investment) in
a context of imperfect discrimination due to asymmetric information between farmers and
the regulator.1 There, in order to insure all farmers a minimum parity income, there is a
need to transfer money to high-cost and low income farmers. But these transfers can be
1See also Lewis, Ware and Feenstra (1989), Chambers (1992) and Hueth (2000).
2claimed by high income farmers as well and hence an optimal policy deters these claims by
tying income support programs to production or acreage limits that are more costly to the
high-income farmers. Innes (2003) pursues this line of research by showing that it is also
important to incorporate the e⁄ects of the policy on all market prices and in particular on
farmland prices. In particular, it may be optimal to implement some compensated acreage
limitations for high-cost farmers together with low-cost farmers cultivating more acreage than
they otherwise would.
Besides, the optimal design of environmental regulation in agriculture has been extensively
studied. For instance, Bontems, Turpin and Rotillon (2005, 2007) study an output regulation
aimed at reducing negative externalities and that takes into account the political power of
farmers and the pre-intervention distribution of farming incomes. More recently, Sheri⁄
(2008) analyzes the optimal design of environmental regulation taking into account the need
to support income and the existence of price uncertainty while Feng (2007) looks at a model
of optimal green payments for conservation and income support goals, where farmers are
heterogeneous along two dimensions (farm size and conservation e¢ ciency).2
Despite the interesting results gathered by the literature, it is fair to observe that many of
these normative models typically rely on a rather crude modelling of farmer￿ s behavior with
often only one decision to be taken (production or land cultivated). Hence, the regulation
is optimally designed on a exogenously and very limited set of variables in order to achieve
several goals simultaneously. The purpose of the paper is to theoretically explore the optimal
design of both income support and agri-environmental regulation in a more general model
where farmer￿ s decisions cover several variable inputs such as fertilizer, land cultivated and
labor devoted to production. Given the existing policies, another important decision for a
farmer is whether to stay as an active farmer or to give up production and lease out all his
land endowment and allocating his labour to the next best alternative in terms of wages. In
other words, the size of the agricultural sector is endogenous in the analysis. The goal of
2See also Wu and Babcock (1995) for an earlier analysis.
3the government is to redistribute income among a population of heterogenous farmers taking
into account the potential negative externalities of production and its budget constraint. The
intensity of redistribution depends on the social preferences towards redistribution through
the degree of social aversion to inequality. The amount of damage caused by production
depends on all polluting inputs used and also of the size of land cultivated. For instance,
if environmental damage is primarily driven by intensi￿cation then increasing the land used
reduces damages holding the level of polluting inputs constant.
Importantly, the policies that the government can implement are constrained by the
information available. First, we assume that farmers are heterogenous according to their
ability in the production process which is private information. In addition, the e⁄ort (or
labour) devoted to production constitutes a private decision of farmers and hence is non
observable to the regulator. However, we assume that the regulator is able to observe the
accounting pro￿t (pro￿t gross of the disutility of labor) at the individual level. In addition,
the status of agent (active farmer or not) is observable so that the regulator can implement
a poll subsidy/tax on all non active farmers that lease out their lands.
We derive the optimal regulation policy in two di⁄erent settings. First, we assume in
addition that a very powerful regulator is able to gather observations of all relevant farmer￿ s
individual decisions (production, inputs). We show that unless some separability conditions
hold for the production function, it is generally optimal to distort the taxation of polluting
inputs like fertilizers from the traditional pigovian rule for redistributive purposes. We also
study the shape of the optimal transfer and its progressive/regressive feature depending on
the social preferences towards redistribution and the respective political weights of di⁄erent
types of farmers. Second, we consider a more realistic setting where the regulator has only
access to aggregate decisions and hence cannot do better than employing linear tax/subsidy
when regulating the output or the variable inputs. In this setting, the optimal policy is a
combination of linear tax/subsidy on output and inputs and a non linear transfer based on the
observation of accounting pro￿t. Here, the Principle of Targeting breaks down as the income
4subsidy based on the observed accounting pro￿t is in￿ uenced by the negative externality.
We hence obtain results that are related to the ones obtained by Cremer et al. (1998)
in the context of income non linear taxation and commodities taxes for the consumer case.
Our model di⁄ers in that it is ￿rst in a context of production, also because the political or
social weights of individuals appear in the analysis and ￿nally because individuals may opt
to quit the production sector making the size of the agricultural sector endogenous. Last,
another di⁄erence lies into the fact that we endogenize the price of some good (namely the
farmland price) which then depends on the policy implemented. There, the objective of the
government now also takes into account the opportunity cost of land devoted to agriculture
and the rents for landowners. We study the in￿ uence of income support and environmental
policies on the equilibrium price of farmland.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to assumptions and no-
tations. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to benchmark cases, the laissez-faire equilibrium and
the ￿rst best. We analyze the second best regulation in section 5 and the optimal regulation
under observable aggregate variables in section 6. Section 7 is devoted to the endogeneization
of farmland price. Section 8 concludes.
2 Assumptions and notations
Consider a farmer with the following production technology:
q = f(l;z;e;￿)
where q denotes the agricultural production;l is the land used, z is a variable marketed input
(say chemical fertilizers, pesticides, energy...), e is the production-enhancing e⁄ort supplied
by the farmer and ￿ is a one-dimensional productivity parameter.3 We assume that land l is
essential to production, i.e. f(0;z;e;￿) = 0. We assume that f is smooth and is increasing
in all its arguments, i.e. fi > 0; 8i = l;z;e;￿:4 Parameter ￿ can be interpreted as a value
3The extension of the model to more than two inputs is straightforward.
4We denote fx =
@f
@x as the partial derivate of f with respect to x.
5characterizing the farmer himself in terms of ability to produce or some ￿xed characteristics
of the production process. Here, a larger ￿ means a more e¢ cient production process. We
assume that ￿ belongs to a compact set ￿ = [￿;￿] with distribution K(￿) and a positive
density k(￿) on ￿.
The e⁄ort e can be interpreted as the quantity of e⁄ective labor devoted to production
or even as the (continuous) choice of technology intensity employed on the farm. More e⁄ort
which is costly in time or a more intensive technology allows to increase production.
In addition, we also assume that f is supermodular in (l;z;e;￿), that is, fij ￿ 0, 8i 6= j
with (i;j) 2 fl;z;e;￿g. This amounts to suppose that the technology is normal in all inputs
in the sense of Rader (1968) and hence exhibits some complementarity between the variables.
The agricultural accounting pro￿t absent any governmental intervention is given by the






pq ￿ r(l ￿ l
￿




is the initial endowment in land and r the market price of land. Also, p and w are
respectively the market price of output and polluting input which are assumed to be constant.
We denote z(￿) and l(￿) the optimal (interior) allocation of polluting input and land from
the perspective of a type-￿ farmer.
Each farmer has a utility function U(I;e) where I is the net income. We assume that U
takes the following quasi-linear form U = I ￿  (e) where   is the (monetary) cost of e⁄ort
with  0 > 0 and  00 > 0.
The farmer can quit the agricultural sector and obtain an outside wage v together with
the returns from renting his land endowment: Hence, in the laissez-faire situation, a farmer
is actually active and produces if and only if
￿(e;p;r;w;￿;l
￿
) ￿  (e) ￿ v + rl
￿
. (1)
Note that this free entry/exit condition (1) does not depend on l
￿
as the optimal allocation
z(￿) and l(￿) do not depend on l
￿
as well. But the distribution of income obviously depends on
6the distribution of land endowment. We assume that the outside wage is constant (otherwise,
we would have to model a second sector of production where workers are employed).
We assume that producing entails an environmental damage x which is related to the
intensity of input usage
x = x(z;l)
and we assume that x(:;:) is increasing in the ￿rst argument z. Concerning the land use, if the
environmental damage is primarily caused by the intensi￿cation of production process then
it is natural to assume that x(:;:) is decreasing in l. In that case, obviously the intervention
of the regulator would call a for land subsidy. Conversely, if damage is instead driven by
excessive use of marginal land, then it would be natural to assume that x(:;:) is increasing
in l.
3 Laissez-faire equilibrium with free entry/exit
In the absence of governmental support, the farmer has to take four decisions: ￿rst whether
to stay active or to leave the sector, if active how much land, fertilizer and e⁄ort to put in
the production process. Note that the entry condition only depends on ￿, hence it follows
that a farmer with type ^ ￿ decides to stay then any farmer with type ￿ > ^ ￿ stays active as
well. This implies that the set of active farmers is only determined by the ability ￿ and is
[￿s;￿].
The equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions:
pfl(l;z;e;￿) = r
pfz(l;z;e;￿) = w
pfe(l;z;e;￿) =  0
which gives the equilibrium allocation for an active ￿-type farmer, l(￿), z(￿) and e(￿). Also,
the (interior) marginal farmer ￿s who is indi⁄erent between producing and leaving the agri-
7cultural sector is such that:
U(￿s) = pf(l(￿s);z(￿s);e(￿s);￿s) ￿ wz(￿s) ￿ r(l(￿s) ￿ l
￿
) ￿  (e(￿s)) = v + rl
￿
or equivalently
pf(l(￿s);z(￿s);e(￿s);￿s) ￿ wz(￿s) ￿ rl(￿s) ￿  (e(￿s)) = v.
This condition means that the return of production must be at least superior to the next
best alternative v. Note that this condition is independent of the land endowment l
￿
.
4 The First Best
We now examine the benchmark situation where the regulator intervenes without informa-
tional constraints. Indeed, we assume that the regulator can observe costlessly the status
of agents (farmer or not), the individual decisions over l, z, q and the accounting pro￿t ￿:
In addition, we assume in this section that the regulator is able to observe the e⁄ort e and
the type ￿. The objective of the regulator is to maximize a weighted sum of social value of
utilities. The social value of utility U is denoted W(U) where W(:) is increasing, concave,
re￿ ecting the desire to redistribute income from the richer to the poorer farmers. The so-
cial (or political) weight in the welfare function is denoted ￿(￿) for a type-￿ farmer. If this
weight function is increasing in ￿ then the basic desire to redistribute (W(U) is concave)
is counterbalanced by the fact that richer farmers have also a higher weight in the welfare
function. A transfer T(￿) is paid to any type-￿ active farmer and a transfer ￿ is paid to
any non active farmer. The budget devoted to the agricultural sector is denoted B while the
maximal environmental damage which is sustainable is given by X.
















T(￿)dK(￿) ￿ B (2)
Z ￿
￿s
x(z(￿);l(￿))dK(￿) ￿ X (3)
U(￿) ￿ v + rl
￿
+ ￿ for any ￿ ￿ ￿s
U(￿) = ￿(￿) + T(￿) ￿  (e(￿))
where ￿(￿) = pf(l(￿);z(￿);e(￿);￿) ￿ r(l(￿) ￿ l
￿
) ￿ wz(￿). Also ￿(￿) is a positive function of
￿ with the normalization
R ￿
￿ ￿(￿)d￿ = 1 which represents as indicated above the social (or
political) weight of type-￿ farmers in the welfare function.
Let us denote by ￿ the Lagrange multiplier of the environmental constraint (3) and by
￿ the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint (2). Solving the regulator￿ s program, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 At the ￿rst best, the optimal allocation devoted to a type-￿ farmer is such
that








pfe(l;z;e;￿) =  0(e)
and the (interior) marginal farmer is such that




Last, the ￿rst best is characterized by the equality between marginal social value of utility
across types:
￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) = ￿0W0(v + rl
￿
+ ￿) = ￿:




Proof: See appendix A.
As can be seen from the Proposition, the First Best allocation entails a Pigovian tax/subsidy
on both z and l. More precisely, if the optimal allocation is l￿(￿) and z￿(￿), then the
regulator can decentralize the ￿rst best allocation by implementing a personalized tax per
unit of land equal to
￿
￿xl(z￿(￿);l￿(￿)) and a personalized tax per unit of fertilizer equal to
￿
￿xz(z￿(￿);l￿(￿)).5 Note that in the case of land, it can be a subsidy if damage is primarily
driven by intensi￿cation (xl < 0). In addition, the optimal distribution of incomes is obtained
through personalized transfers T(￿) for active farmers and a uniform transfer ￿ for inactive
agents. Note also that there is no need to regulate the e⁄ort once z and l are driven to their
e¢ cient levels.
Last, the identity of the marginal farmer is such that the return of production from
the marginal farmer net of the social damage weighted by the shadow price of public funds
should be equal to the outside wage. It follows that the intervention tends to reduce the
size of the agricultural sector by taking into account the social cost of production in terms of
environmental damages.
5 The second best with observable individual decisions
We now suppose that the regulator can always observe the accounting pro￿t ￿ and the status
of any agent (being an active farmer or not). In addition, we will assume that the regulator
may observe individual decisions like the land used, the quantity of fertilizer used and the
production level. However, the e⁄ort level and the productivity parameter are unobservable
to the regulator.
Given its information set, the regulator is able to consider a general policy of the form
f￿;^ t(￿;z;l;q)g where ￿ is the transfer paid to any farmer stopping his activity and t is
5The tax would have been uniform if we had instead assumed that the aggregate pollution level is a function
~ X(Z;L) where Z is the aggregate consumption of polluting input z and L the aggregate use of farmland. The
constraint would then write ~ X(Z;L) ￿ X.
10the transfer paid to each active farmer as a function of observable variables. Note that
actually a transfer t(￿;z;l) is equivalent to the transfer ^ t(￿;z;l;q), because we have q =






From the Revelation Principle, any mechanism f￿;t(￿;z;l)g is equivalent to a direct reve-
lation mechanism f￿;￿(￿);z(￿);l(￿);T(￿)g where T(:) is the transfer paid by the regulator
to a producing agent and in which truthtelling is an optimal strategy for each farmer. For
simplicity, we assume the di⁄erentiability of the policy.6 The program of the regulator can





















U(￿s) = v + rl
￿
+ ￿
U(￿) ￿ U(￿;~ ￿) for any ￿;~ ￿
U(￿) = ￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);e(￿)) + T(￿) ￿  (e(￿))
￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);e(￿)) = pf(l(￿);z(￿);e(￿);￿) ￿ wz(￿) ￿ r(l(￿) ￿ l
￿
)
Given that the regulator observes ￿ together with l and z, it is interesting to denote the
e⁄ort E(￿;l;z;￿) needed to generate a pro￿t ￿ using l and z for a type-￿ farmer. As fe > 0,
the equation ￿ = ￿(￿;l;z;e) = pf(l;z;e;￿) ￿ wz ￿ r(l ￿ l
￿
) de￿nes implicitly the function




< 0, E￿ =
1
pfe
> 0, El = ￿
pfl ￿ r
pfe




Hence, the e⁄ort needed decreases with ability and increase with the pro￿t goal. Whether E
6Standard arguments allow to prove the di⁄erentiability almost everywhere.
11increases or not with l or z depends on whether the optimum involves under-use (compared
to the private optimum) of land or fertilizer or not.
Proposition 2 At a separating optimum, the allocation devoted to a type-￿ active farmer is
characterized by:
































￿(￿)W0(U(￿))dK(￿) + ￿0W0(v + rl
￿
+ ￿)K(￿s) > 0:







 0(e(￿s)) E￿j￿=￿s = v
Proof: See appendix B.
A direct comparison between the ￿rst best and the second best suggests that the ￿rst-
order conditions for l, z and e are now corrected by a new term due to incentive compatibility.
Let us consider for instance the condition for land use:7









This equation can be interpreted as follows: in the absence of asymmetric information on
￿ (￿rst best) then ￿(￿) = 0 so that we recover the ￿rst-best rule described before. Under
asymmetric information, there is a need to introduce an incentive distortion due to the fact
that by distorting l it is possible to extract rents in order to redistribute income across
7The interpretation of the condition for z is similar.
12farmers. Note that we get the usual result of no distortion at the top as ￿(￿) = 0 which
means no distortion for the highest type of farmers. Actually,
d(E￿)
dl measures how much land
use l a⁄ects the potential e⁄ort savings (E￿ < 0) associated with an increase in e¢ ciency. It






















which means in terms of elasticity that the elasticity of marginal productivity of ability
with respect to land use is lower than the elasticity of marginal productivity of e⁄ort with
respect to land use. In other words, land use has a more (positive) in￿ uence on the marginal
productivity of e⁄ort than on the marginal productivity of ability.
It follows that by increasing the land use of a type-￿ farmer, one also decreases the
(positive) rate of growth U0(￿) = ￿ 0E￿ of the rent devoted to this farmer and hence the
rents to all more e¢ cient farmers (between ￿ and ￿). The social cost of this decrease is
￿(￿)
d(U0(￿))
dl . On the other hand, the distortion in l for type ￿ relative to the ￿rst best
level
￿




has social cost ￿
￿




and occurs with probability k(￿). The
trade-o⁄between redistribution and e¢ ciency thus yields to the condition in the Proposition.
Finally, for the highest type, there is no more e¢ cient farmers on which one would want to
extract rents and this calls for e¢ ciency at the top, i.e. ￿(￿) = 0.
Now it is possible to obtain a result in the spirit of La⁄ont-Tirole (1991) on the dichotomy
between the tasks of redistributing income among farmers and the tasks of correctly pricing
land and fertilizer by taking into account externalities.
Proposition 3 The tasks of distributing income support among farmers and the tasks of
correctly pricing land and fertilizer by taking into account externalities are disconnected if
f(l;z;e;￿) = f(l;z;h(e;￿)). Under this assumption, we obtain the ￿rst-best rules for land
13and fertilizer (for a given e⁄ort)








while the e⁄ort remains distorted for redistributive purposes






















This Proposition applies for instance if f is a Cobb-Douglas function, i.e. f = ￿e￿1z￿2l￿3.
Proposition 3 implies that the second best can be decentralized through a pure pigouvian
regulation of x and l together with a non linear subsidy t as a function of ￿ alone for
redistributive purposes.
Concerning the e⁄ort decision, we have




























as fee ￿ 0 and f￿e ￿ 0. This means that increasing the e⁄ort allows to increase the rate U0(￿)
of growth of rents. This means that if the objective is to redistribute income towards the
poorer farmers (i.e. if ￿(￿) < 0), it might be optimal to reduce the incentives to exert e⁄ort.
14This is because increasing the e⁄ort amounts to ￿nally get a more unequal distribution of
incomes in the population. This expresses the con￿ ict between the search for more equity
between heterogenous farmers and e¢ ciency. On the contrary, when ￿(￿) > 0, it is optimal
to give incentives for e⁄ort in order to generate more incomes to the more e¢ cient farmers.
It then appears that it is crucial to understand how the nature of objective (the desire
to redistribute and the presence of social weights for di⁄erent types of farmers) will generate
the direction of the distortions under second best and this is precisely the role of ￿(￿).
5.2 Implementation
Before looking at the sign of ￿(￿), it is interesting to go back to the way the optimal policy
can be implemented through the generalized transfer t(￿;z;l) intented for active farmers.8
Facing such a transfer, the type-￿ farmer maximizes his utility by choosing the land l, the
fertilizer level z and the e⁄ort e (or equivalently the pro￿t level ￿):
max
￿;z;l
U = ￿ + t(￿;z;l) ￿  (E(￿;l;z;￿))


















￿  0El = 0












using (4). This means that whenever ￿(￿) > (<)0, then the transfer t increases (decreases)
in the observed level of pro￿t. Intuitively, when ￿(￿) > 0, such a pattern gives incentives
to the farmer to exert more e⁄ort. Conversely, when ￿(￿) < 0, it is optimal to reduce the
incentives to exert e⁄ort as this goes against the search for a more equal distribution of
8Recall that non active farmers receive the uniform transfer ￿.
15incomes. Furthermore, at the top (￿ = ￿), the marginal rate of subsidy is @t
@￿ = 0 because
￿(￿) = 0.
Concerning the fertilizer level, we have
@t
@z















It follows that the transfer should decrease with the fertilizer use due to the damage im-








which once again means in terms of elasticity that the elasticity of marginal productivity of
ability with respect to fertilizer use is larger than the elasticity of marginal productivity of
e⁄ort with respect to fertilizer use, then
d(E￿)
dz < 0. This means that if ￿(￿) < 0 then it is
optimal to increase the implicit taxation of fertilizer for redistributive issues.9
In other words, if
d(E￿)
dz < 0 then ceteris paribus the taxation on fertilizer is heavier than
under the ￿rst best. In that case, if one increases the fertilizer use of a type-￿ farmer, one
also increases the rent of all more e¢ cient farmers which goes against inequality preferences.
Hence, the tax on fertilizer cannot escape from redistribution considerations except under the
pricing-dichotomy assumption. The intuition goes as follows: when
dU0(￿)
dz = ￿ 0 d(f￿=fe)
dz ￿ 0,
then more fertilizer makes it easier for the farmers to convert a superior ability into less e⁄ort.
A farmer who wants to mimic the pro￿t of a lower ability farmer uses more fertilizer than the
farmer being mimicked. Finally, there is no reason to overtax the more able because there is
nobody more able than him, hence ￿rst best taxation rule occurs.10
9Obviously, we would have the same situation but for opposite reasons when ￿(￿) > 0 and
d(E￿)
dz > 0.
10A similar interpretation holds for the land use as well.
165.3 The direction of distortions
As suggested above, of utmost importance for the direction of the incentive distortions is the
sign of the marginal cost of incentive compatibility ￿(￿). For instance, from (4), we know that




then it is optimal to distort downward the e⁄ort provided
by all active farmers (except at the top). On the contrary, each times ￿(￿) is positive this
entails that distorting upwards the e⁄ort is optimal.

















depending in particular on the social weight function ￿(￿). The following lemma is useful to
obtain further results concerning the sign of ￿(￿):
Lemma 4 The marginal weighted social utility of income ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is increasing in ￿
if and only if the elasticity ￿(￿) = ￿￿0(￿)=￿(￿) of the social weight function is greater than
￿(￿) = ￿￿W00(U(￿))U0(￿)=W0(U(￿)), the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal social

















Let us denote ￿(￿) = ￿￿0(￿)=￿(￿) the elasticity of the political weight function ￿(:) w.r.t ￿.
Also let us de￿ne ￿(￿) = ￿
￿W00(U(￿))U0(￿)
W0(U(￿)) as the absolute value of the elasticity of W0(U(￿))
17with respect to ￿ (recall that W is concave and that U0 > 0). Hence, ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) > 0 if
and only if ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿).
Hence the social weight function ￿(￿) has to be su¢ ciently increasing in ￿ in order to
counterbalance the desire to redistribute which is expressed by the concavity of W. In the
following, we describe the situations where the function ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is assumed to be
monotone in ￿, either increasing or decreasing.
We now introduce the following condition.
Condition 5 The marginal weighted social utility of the income of the mean non active
farmer, ￿0W0(U(￿s)), is greater or equal to the average marginal weighted social utility of
income for all agents, ￿.
From (6), this condition is equivalent to ￿(￿s) < 0. This essentially means that the social
weight of the poorest agents is rather high compared to the total population of farmers. In
particular, Condition 5 holds in the particular case of equal social weights (￿(￿) = 1 for any
￿). We are now able to establish the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Assume that the marginal weighted social utility of income ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is
decreasing in ￿ or equivalently that ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿). Then,
(i) the transfer t(￿;l;z) decreases in ￿ if and only if Condition 5 holds,
(ii) the transfer t(￿;l;z) is ￿rst increasing and second decreasing in ￿ if and only if Condition
5 does not hold.
Proof: See appendix C.
The context described by Proposition 6 is one where the priority in terms of income
support is directed towards the less e¢ cient farmers, including those who are not active.
This is because the marginal weighted social utility of income is decreasing in ￿. We would
then expect that the transfer should optimally decrease with the observed level of pro￿t ￿ as
18this is the way to reduce incentives to exert e⁄ort which entails a more equal distribution of
incomes in the population. This intuitive result holds but only under Condition 1. Actually,
as suggested by part (ii), it is possible for the optimal policy to gives incentives for e⁄ort for
the less e¢ cient active farmers by making t an increasing function of observed ￿.
Consider for instance the particular case where ￿(￿) = 1 for any ￿ (equal social weight
situation). Here the only task of the government is to redistribute from the rich to the poor
as W is concave. One can check that ￿(￿) is negative, ￿rst decreasing then increasing. This
means that the point where there is the highest decrease in the transfer when ￿ increases lies
somewhere between ￿s and ￿.
Note ￿nally that because of the no distortion at the top result, the transfer is always
locally convex in the neighborhood of ￿(￿) which means that the rate of decrease in the
transfer is diminishing when approaching the highest level of pro￿t.
Examining the opposite situation where ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is an increasing function of ￿, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Assume that the marginal weighted social utility of income ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is
increasing in ￿ or equivalently that ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿). Then, the transfer t(￿;l;z) is increasing in
￿.
Proof: See appendix D.
From Proposition 7, we deduce that it is optimal to make the transfer an increasing
function of ￿ in order to give incentives to exert e⁄ort. Nevertheless, from the no distortion
at the top result, t is locally concave around ￿(￿). The highest marginal rate of subsidy is
hence interior or in ￿s.
6 Observable aggregate variables
In this section, we discuss the optimal design of the income support and environmental policy
when the regulator cannot observe the individual variables like the output level, the use of
19variable input like fertilizers or the amount of land involved in production. Hence, the policy
can only rely on the observation of the status of each agent and their accounting pro￿t.
However, as the regulator can observe the aggregate consumption of fertilizer or land and the
aggregate level of output, linear taxes are available. The taxes on output, land and fertilizer
are denoted respectively tq, tl and tz. In that case, we have to compute the optimal reaction
of a farmer to these linear taxes.
The problem of the regulator is now to ￿nd the optimal uniform transfer ￿ for non active
farmers, the optimal non linear transfer t as a function of observed ￿ together with the linear
taxes tq, tl and tz in order to maximize the social welfare subject to the budget constraint




U = (p + tq)f(l;z;e;￿) ￿ (w + tz)z ￿ (r + tl)(l ￿ l
￿
) + t(￿) ￿  (e)
where ￿ = (p+tq)f(l;z;e;￿)￿(w+tz)z￿(r+tl)(l￿l
￿
). We denote z￿, l￿ and e￿ the optimal





Solving the regulator￿ s problem, we establish the following Proposition.
Proposition 8 At an optimal separating policy, the non linear transfer t(￿) depends on the
presence of environmental externalities. The optimal e⁄ort of a type-￿ farmer is given by














Proof: See appendix E.
Comparing with Proposition 2, we now have two additional terms in determining the in-
centives to exert e⁄ort and thereby the way the non linear transfer t(￿) evolves. The last two
terms of (8) correspond to the marginal impact of the e⁄ort on the pro￿t net of the environ-
mental damage. This is due to the fact that with only one non linear instrument, the regulator




de ) but also
the in￿ uence of t(￿) on the decisions over land and fertilizer taken by the farmer. In other
20words, the income support policy must now take into account the presence of externalities
contrary to the preceding section.
Intuitively, suppose for instance that pfz￿w￿
￿
￿xz < 0 which means that at the optimum
the type-￿ farmer over-uses fertilizer compared to the ￿rst best. If increasing the e⁄ort also
contributes to increase the fertilizer use, then the last term is positive and this means that it
is optimal to reduce the transfer t(￿) at the margin because of the negative externalities due
to z.
The linear taxes are designed optimally by taking account all their e⁄ects on incentives.
Consider for instance the case of the optimal linear tax on fertilizer. From the appendix E













































Hence, the tax tz is set such that the total marginal impact on pro￿t net of damage is equal to
the total marginal impact on the informational rents left to all active farmers. In other words,
when manipulating the tax rate tz the regulator will modify the decisions taken with respect
to fertilizer and also land use. This will impact the social surplus of production ￿ ￿
￿
￿x. The
other impact is that this tax in￿ uences the distribution of incomes in the population (which
is re￿ ected by the term . We have a similar interpretation for the tax tl on land and the
subsidy tq on production.
7 Introducing an endogenous market price for lands
In this section, we go back to the second best analysis of section 5 but we also introduce the
possibility of having an endogenous market price for land. For simplicity, we consider only
21the case where the social weights are equal (￿(￿) = 1 for any ￿).
Let L the total amount of land used in the agricultural sector and V (L) the value (or
opportunity cost) of land in other sectors, that is increasing and concave. The market value
of land per acre is then given by
r(L) = ￿V 0(L)
where r0(L) > 0 because of diminishing returns to land use in other sectors.








dK(￿) and we denote also L the total land used for agriculture. N
represents the number of farmers that is hereafter normalized to equal one, N = 1. Similarly,
for non agriculture usage, we have L
￿
NA and LNA. We have










where LT = L + LNA is the aggregate land use and c(:) is the increasing, convex cost of
developing new lands. We also have
max
LNA
B(LNA) ￿ rLNA , B0(LNA) = r = ￿V 0(L)
It follows that the associated supply function is LS(r) and it is given implicitly by r =
r(L ￿ L
￿







where we denote the demand for land from a type-￿ farmer by l￿(r￿;￿). The model en-
compasses the limit cases where the supply of land is either ￿xed (perfectly inelastic) as in
Guyomard et al. (2005) or perfectly elastic (which means that r is constant) as in Bourgeon
and Chambers (2000).
The objective of the regulator is written as the sum of social utility of pro￿ts plus the
value of land use and the land rents of the landowners. However, because the social utility W












with the opportunity cost of land use and the rents of landowners which can be written as
B(LNA) ￿ r(LNA ￿ L
￿









= B(LNA) + r(L ￿ L
￿





= V (L) + r(L ￿ L
￿
)
Hence, the objective of the regulator sums up to maximize
CE(U) + V (L) + r(L ￿ L
￿
)
under the budget constraint, the environmental constraint and the incentive compatibility
constraints as written in section 5. Solving this program, we establish the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 9 Assuming a separating optimal policy, the optimal allocation of land use with
endogenous market price for land is given by























(￿ ￿ 1)L ￿ ￿K(￿s)l
￿i
:
Proof: See appendix F.
Proposition 9 suggests that when the market price is endogenous, the optimal policy now
takes into account the shadow price ￿ of the aggregate land demand L from the agricultural
sector. Obviously, if the market price r is constant (r0(L) = 0) then we are back to Proposition
235, with the only minor di⁄erence in the evolution of ￿(￿) due to the normalization through
the certainty equivalent CE(U) in the objective in place of E￿W(U).
The intuition of the expression of ￿ goes as follows. As r0(L) > 0, due to diminishing
returns to land use in other sectors, each time we increase marginally the land use l(￿) for a
type-￿ farmer, this has also some consequences for the rest of the economy. Indeed, as the
price r increases, this induces a marginal loss to all active farmers who have to pay a larger
price for land and this needs a compensation in terms of income support which costs ￿ times
L. But on the other hand, we also increase the rents of landowners marginally over L units.
Last, we also increase the income of non active farmers (in proportion K(￿s)) who rent their
endowment l
￿
and hence are less needed to get socially costly income support:
Consequently, if the drawback for active farmers outweighs the advantage for landowners￿
rents and non active farmers￿income, then at the optimum, we have ￿ > 0. Hence, if we
assume for simplicity the absence of asymmetric information (￿(￿) = 0) and the absence of
land impact on the environmental constraint (xl = 0), then the optimal land use of a type-￿
farmer should be set such that the private marginal return should be equal to the social price
which is equal to r plus the positive shadow price ￿ weighted by the shadow cost ￿ of the
budget constraint. In other words, it is optimal ceteris paribus to induce an under-use of
land compared to the ￿rst best with constant market price given by pfl = r.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a model of regulation for a set of heterogenous farmers
whose production yields to environmental externalities. The goal of the regulator is ￿rst to
o⁄er some income support depending on collective preferences towards income redistribution
and second to internalize externalities. The optimal policy is constrained by the information
available. We ￿rst considered the second best where the regulator is able to observe all
individuals decisions in terms of inputs and individual pro￿t, but not the individual farming
labor supply. We characterized the generalized transfer in function of the desire to redistribute
24and the underlying characteristics of the production process. In a second step, we assumed
that the regulator has only information on aggregate consumption of inputs and hence can
only tax/subsidy linearly inputs and output. However, because the accounting pro￿t remains
observable, a non linear transfer of pro￿t is still part of the optimal policy. In the last part
of the paper, we have endogenized the market price of land and examine how the optimal
policy should be modi￿ed.
Obviously, the limit of such an approach of income support and agri-environmental reg-
ulation lies in its static character. Also a natural extension would consider a model where
farmers are heterogenous along other dimensions, for instance the endowment in land l
￿
or
the disutility of e⁄ort. Finally, it would be interesting to introduce price and production
uncertainty (see Sheri⁄ 2008 for a ￿rst approach) to better understand the insurance role of
regulation in agriculture. All these interesting extensions are devoted to further research.
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A Proof of proposition 1



























Pointwise maximization gives us the following ￿rst-order conditions:
￿(￿)W0(U(￿))[pfl ￿ r] = ￿xl
￿(￿)W0(U(￿))[pfz ￿ r] = ￿xz
￿(￿)W0(U(￿))
￿




for any ￿ ￿ ￿s. Also, derivating with respect to ￿, we get
￿0W0(v + rl
￿
+ ￿) = ￿
where we denote ￿0 = 1
K(￿s)
R ￿s




= ￿￿x(z(￿s);l(￿s)) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ T(￿s)) = 0
which gives the identity of the marginal farmer. This concludes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 2
A type-￿ farmer solves the following program:
max
e;~ ￿
￿(~ ￿) + T(~ ￿) ￿  (e)
s.t.
￿(~ ￿) = pf(l(~ ￿);z(~ ￿);e;￿) ￿ wz(~ ￿) ￿ r(l(~ ￿) ￿ l
￿
)
28Hence the farmer￿ s program can be rewritten as follows:
max
~ ￿
￿(~ ￿) + T(~ ￿) ￿  (E(￿;l(~ ￿);z(~ ￿);￿(~ ￿)))
and we denote U(￿;~ ￿) = ￿(~ ￿) + T(~ ￿) ￿  (E(￿;l(~ ￿);z(~ ￿);￿(~ ￿))) the utility of a type-￿ farmer





















= ￿0(￿) + T0(￿) ￿  0 ￿












Ell0(￿) + Ezz0(￿) + E￿￿0(￿)
￿
￿  0 ￿












 00E￿E￿ +  0E￿￿
￿
￿ 0
which will be checked ex-post.
If we denote U(￿) = U(￿;￿) then we have
U0(￿) = ￿ 0(e)E￿(￿;l;z;￿(￿;l;z;e)) > 0
so that the rent is increasing in ￿:





















U(￿s) = v + rl
￿
+ ￿
U0(￿) = ￿ 0(e(￿))E￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);e(￿)))


















U(￿s) = v + rl
￿
+ ￿
U0(￿) = ￿ 0(e(￿))E￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);e(￿)))
￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);e(￿)) = pf(l(￿);z(￿);e(￿);￿) ￿ wz(￿) ￿ r(l(￿) ￿ l
￿
)













U(￿) ￿ pf(l(￿);z(￿);e(￿);￿) + wz(￿) + r(l(￿) ￿ l
￿
















￿ 0E￿ ￿ U0(￿)
￿
d￿













as ￿(￿) = 0 because the value of U at ￿ is free. Replacing in the Lagrangean (and recall that
U(￿s) = v + rl
￿













U(￿) ￿ pf(l(￿);z(￿);e(￿);￿) + wz(￿) + r(l(￿) ￿ l
￿





















￿0(￿)U(￿) ￿ ￿(￿) 0E￿
￿
d￿







= ￿0W0(v + rl
￿
+ ￿)K(￿s) ￿ ￿K(￿s) + ￿(￿s) = 0 (10)
@L
@l(￿)
















= ￿(￿)W0(U(￿))k(￿) ￿ ￿k(￿) + ￿0(￿) = 0
and @L







 0(e(￿s)) E￿j￿=￿s = v:


















￿(￿)W0(U(￿))dK(￿) + ￿0W0(v + rl
￿
+ ￿)K(￿s) > 0
which represents the sum of all marginal (weighted) social utilities. And we also obtain that
￿(￿s) =
h















This concludes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that the function ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is decreasing in ￿. Part (i): from equation (5), @t
@￿ < 0
everywhere if and only if ￿(￿) is non positive everywhere. As the function ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is
31decreasing in ￿, there are two possible situations. Either ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is lower than ￿ for
any ￿ and consequently ￿0(￿) > 0 everywhere.11 As ￿(￿) is increasing and because ￿(￿) = 0,
it must be that Condition 5 ￿(￿s) < 0 holds. Or ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) intersects once ￿ for an
intermediate value of ￿ and consequently ￿0(￿) is ￿rst negative then positive. Once again,
for ￿(￿) to be non positive everywhere, Condition 5 must hold. Conversely, if Condition 5
holds then ￿(￿) is non positive everywhere. Otherwise, the assumption that ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is
decreasing in ￿ would be violated.
Part (ii): from equation (5), @t
@￿ is ￿rst positive then negative if and only if ￿(￿) is ￿rst
















which is possible if ￿(￿) increases su¢ ciently in ￿.
Note also that ￿(￿) cannot be positive for any ￿. Indeed, for ￿(￿) to be positive every-






which is impossible as
R ￿
￿s ￿(￿)W0(U(￿))dK(￿) > ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)).
Conversely, if Conditions 5 does not hold then ￿(￿s) is positive and ￿(￿) is necessarily
negative in the neighborhood of ￿. Hence, @t
@￿ is ￿rst positive then negative: This concludes
the proof.
11For this case to be possible, a su¢ cient condition is that ￿(￿) decreases in ￿. Indeed, ￿(￿)W
0(U(￿)) is
lower than ￿ everywhere if and only if ￿(￿s)W




0(U(￿))dK(￿) + [￿0K(￿s) ￿ ￿(￿s)]W
0(U(￿s)) > 0:
A su¢ cient condition is ￿0K(￿s) > ￿(￿s) which is guaranteed when ￿(￿) decreases in ￿.
32D Proof of Proposition 7
Assume that the function ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is increasing in ￿. We have several possibilities for
the pattern of ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) compared to the constant ￿. First consider the case where
￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is greater than ￿ for any ￿. This implies that ￿0(￿) < 0 and hence it must be
that ￿(￿) is positive everywhere so that t is increasing in ￿. Second consider the situation
where ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) intersects once ￿. It follows that ￿(￿) is ￿rst increasing then decreasing.















as ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is increasing in ￿. It follows that ￿(￿) is positive everywhere. Last, it is easy
to check that the case where ￿(￿)W0(U(￿)) is lower than ￿ for any ￿ cannot appear. Indeed,
in such a case, we would have ￿0(￿) > 0 and hence it must be that ￿(￿) < 0 everywhere which
contradicts the fact that ￿(￿s) > 0. This concludes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 8
A type-￿ farmer solves the following program:
max
e;l;z;~ ￿
￿(~ ￿) + T(~ ￿) ￿  (e)
s.t.
￿(~ ￿) = (p + tq)f(l;z;e;￿) ￿ (w + tz)z ￿ (r + tl)(l ￿ l
￿
)




￿(~ ￿) + T(~ ￿) ￿  (E(￿;l;z;￿(~ ￿))):
Given ~ ￿, the optimal solution for l and z is de￿ned by minimizing  (E(￿;l;z;￿(~ ￿))), i.e.:
(p + tq)fl(l;z;E(￿;l;z;￿(~ ￿));￿) = r + tl (i.e. El = 0)
(p + tq)fz(l;z;E(￿;l;z;￿(~ ￿));￿) = w + tz (i.e. Ez = 0):




U(￿;~ ￿) = ￿(~ ￿) + t(~ ￿) ￿  (E(￿;l￿(￿;~ ￿);z￿(￿;~ ￿);￿(~ ￿))):



















= ￿0(￿) + T0(￿) ￿  0E￿￿0(￿) = 0
or equivalently








= ￿ 00E￿￿0(￿)[E￿ + Ell￿
￿ + Ezz￿
￿] ￿  0￿0(￿)[E￿￿ + E￿zz￿
￿ + E￿ll￿
￿] ￿ 0





























































￿ 0 , ￿0(￿) ￿ 0










34under the budget constraint, the environmental constraint and the incentive compatibility
constraint (ignoring the second order conditions) U0(￿) = ￿ 0E￿ ￿ 0.
























U(￿) ￿ pf(l￿;z￿;e;￿) + wz￿ + r(l￿ ￿ l
￿
















U(￿) ￿ pf(l￿;z￿;e;￿) + wz￿ + r(l￿ ￿ l
￿





















￿0(￿)U(￿) ￿ ￿(￿) 0E￿
￿
d￿







= ￿0W0(U(￿s))K(￿s) ￿ ￿K(￿s) + ￿(￿s) = 0 (11)
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@e









































































dtl d￿ = 0
Once again, we obtain for ￿(￿) and ￿ the following similar expressions:








￿(￿)W0(U(￿))dK(￿) + ￿0W0(v + rl
￿
+ ￿)K(￿s) > 0
This concludes the proof.
F Proof of Proposition 9
The program of the regulator can be written as


















U(￿s) = v + rl
￿
+ ￿
U0(￿) = ￿ 0(e(￿))E￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);￿(￿;l(￿);z(￿);e(￿)))







We denote by ￿ the multiplier of the last constraint determining the aggregate land use by the
agricultural sector. Following the preceding analysis, we can write directly the Lagrangean
36as follows









U(￿) ￿ pf(l(￿);z(￿);e(￿);￿) + wz(￿) + r(l(￿) ￿ l
￿






























The ￿rst-order conditions are
@L
@l(￿)
= ￿(pfl ￿ r)k(￿) ￿ ￿xlk(￿) ￿ ￿(￿) 0d(E￿)
dl
￿ ￿k(￿) = 0
@L
@z(￿)
















































Hence, from (12) and (13) we deduce that















(￿ ￿ 1)L ￿ ￿K(￿s)l
￿i






￿ ￿k(￿) + ￿0(￿) = 0
which is equivalent to
W0(U(￿))k(￿)
W0(CE(U))
￿ ￿k(￿) + ￿0(￿) = 0



































This concludes the proof.
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